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Abstract After decades of centralization, in 1980 the central government of the
Netherlands embarked upon an ambitious project to decentralize the administrative
system. It proclaimed a series of general decentralization measures that aimed to
improve the performance of the administrative system and to boost local de-
mocracy. This article presents the results of research into the effects of these
measures. It shows that the decentralization project did not meet the high expecta-
tions. This can be explained by the fact that the theoretical framework underlying the
decentralization policy was overly simple. The authors present a new framework that
represents the contingent character of the effects of decentralization.
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European countries show a great variety of administrative systems (Chandler, 1993;
Bennett, 1993: 28 – 45). Besides marked differences between unitary and federal
states, differences also exist within these two categories. Some Scandinavian unitary
states have relatively strong local governments providing a wide range of public
services uninhibited by detailed administrative regulation. Other unitary states, like
France, have a relatively weak local government (Page and Goldsmith, 1987: 161;
Maurel, 1993). Although the Federal Republic of Germany formed an example for
the designers of the 1978 Constitution of post-Franco Spain, there are substantial
differences in the division of competencies between the central states, the La¨nder
and the Comunidades Autonomas, and the local communities in both countries
(Ferna´ndez Segado, 1994; Agranoff, 1996).
This picture is further complicated by the fact that administrative systems show
continuous shifts in the relations between central and local government. Adminis-
trative systems seem to oscillate between centralization and decentralization. Some
scholars claim that changes in political culture, more than anything else, cause
alternating movements towards centralization and decentralization (Namenwirth
and Weber, 1987). The supposedly fashionable character of shifts towards
centralization and decentralization is deduced from the fact that the same
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arguments are used by some theorists to propagate the claim for decentralization as
well as the claim for centralization (De Vries, 2000: 202). We do not deny that the
dominant political culture in a certain period colors the debate on centralization and
decentralization. In some eras equality is valued higher than efficiency, in others
participation in decision-making is considered more important than the quality of
service delivery. However, we reject the implied suggestion that Fanything goes_ in the
debate on centralization and decentralization, and that scientific knowledge about the
performance of different administrative systems is obsolete. On the contrary, if we
want to rationalize the political debate, it is necessary that claims on positive or
negative effects of centralization and decentralization will be subjected to empirical
scrutiny.
In Spain in the post-Franco era, decentralization of state functions to the Com-
unidades Autonomas was a political imperative. Not only did it address the huge
cultural differences between the regions; it also created a tier of government apt to
fulfil crucial functions of the Welfare State (Carrillo, 1997). But how do the Com-
unidades Autonomas actually perform? Did they become modern institutions of
government that provide public services in an adequate and efficient way, or did
they just reproduce the clientele relationships between central and local government
that existed before? In France, the 1982 decentralization laws aimed to improve the
capacity of local and regional government to respond to the needs of the population
and to promote regional economic development (Maurel, 1993; De Montricher,
1995). In order to envision the next steps in administrative reform, whether these be
extended decentralization or re-centralization, it is imperative that the effects of the
various existing decentralization laws are evaluated: what were the effects and how
did they come about?
Literature in the field of centralization and decentralization is very extensive.
This holds in particular for the area of fiscal federalism and constitutional economics
(see Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003; Breuss and Eller, 2004), and to a lesser degree
for the area of citizen participation in developing countries (e.g., Crook, 2003, Devas
and Grant, 2003). However, systematic research into the impact of decentralization
on the quality of administration is scarce (Fleurke and Willemse, 2004). This article
will present the results of research into the relation between decentralization and
the quality of administration in the Netherlands.
After decades of centralization, in 1980 the central government of the Nether-
lands embarked upon an ambitious project to decentralize the administrative
system. It developed a general approach, proclaiming a series of general
decentralization measures that aimed to improve the performance of the adminis-
trative system and to boost local democracy. In 1995, we engaged in a large research
project financed by the Ministry of the Interior to evaluate the effects of these
decentralization measures. The research problem was formulated as follows:
What are the effects of decentralization in view of the formulated goals of central
government, and how can they be explained?
The Unitary Character of the Administrative System of the Netherlands
The Dutch Constitution of 1848 introduced a decentralized unitary state with three
tiers of general government: central government, the province and the municipality.
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The Constitution stipulates a general competence for provinces and municipalities
to issue ordinances and undertake services that they find necessary in the interest of
their communities. These provisions justify the adjective decentralized, all the more
as dominant normative theories consider municipalities as the basic units of the state
(Toonen, 1987). However, apart from these general provisions the Constitution does
not contain any safeguards for local autonomy. There are no specific competencies
reserved for either provinces or municipalities. The national legislator, i.e., gov-
ernment and the two chambers of parliament, has complete sovereignty and in the
end is not even restricted by the Constitution. The legislative bodies themselves are
free to interpret the Constitution as they see fit and there is no Constitutional Court
to appeal to. National legislation overrules ordinances of lower government bodies.
Ordinances of provinces and municipalities have no force of law in areas where
national legislation is exhaustive. On balance, although the Constitutional frame-
work implies substantial autonomy for local government, it does not contain any
formal obstacles for centralization.
The era of Reconstruction in the aftermath of World War II and the subsequent
rise of the Welfare State have shown what is known as a process of sneaky
centralization. In a piecemeal way central government invaded the domain of local
government. Demands from a great variety of social groups gave rise to national
legislation to guarantee a wide range of public services for all citizens. The scope of
local government however did not diminish. On the contrary, local government
became an important provider of public services. In this respect, Dutch local
government underwent a development similar to local government in other
countries of Northern Europe (Page and Goldsmith, 1987: 156 –157). Expenditure
by local government amounted to more than 30% of total public expenditure.
Specific grants financed a substantial part of local expenditure. In 1984, these
more then 500 grants made up 69% of the total income of local government
(Koopmans et al., 1999: 251), whilst the Municipal Fund–a general compensation
fund that is distributed among municipalities according to a series of objective
criteria to finance local expenditure–only accounted for 24% of the income of local
government. Specific grants came with extensive administrative regulation, giving
detailed rules for the planning of public service delivery and prescribing procedures
for prior approval as well as for giving ex post account for the expenditure. Central
regulation resulted thus in a low level of discretion for local government.
A General Approach to Decentralization
At the end of the seventies, disadvantages of the centralized administrative system
became increasingly obvious. They can be summarized as follows:1
& Central government had reached the limits of its capacity to process the growing
streams of information on increasingly complex policy issues and to react in an
adequate way to demands from an ever more dynamic society. Local government
on the other hand was not well equipped for effective policy making to meet
1 Central government presented this analysis in the first plan for decentralization, the Decentral-
isatienota (1980), p. 17– 18.
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these demands. It lacked discretion in the delivery of public services and
depended strongly on financial resources controlled by central government.
& Local government had to deal with a highly fragmented central government that
hindered an integrated approach to complex policy issues. When planning for
urban renewal projects it was no exception that local government executives had
to negotiate with six different ministries to obtain financial resources, each
ministry stating its own specific and sometimes incompatible terms.
& The lack of discretion caused by the detailed central rules connected with specific
grants impeded local government to customize public service delivery to local
circumstances and needs of individual citizens.
& The widely spread phenomenon of centrally regulated specific grants frustrated
the efficient allocation of resources by local government. As the applicability of
most grants was limited to narrowly defined activities and means there were no
incentives for local government executives to consider alternative, more efficient
policies. As from 1982 the financial crisis of the Welfare State became more
acute, this was considered a major problem and it formed a strong impulse for
decentralization.
& The vitality of local democracy was threatened. Centralization changed the
character of local government. It was no longer the autonomous institution
where locally elected councils decided on ordinances and services they found
necessary in the interest of the local community. It increasingly fulfilled the role
of an agency of the state, executing policies that were decided on by central
government. Why would citizens bother to vote for local councils if in the end
central government decided on all main issues?
In 1980 and 1982 central government launched plans to radically decentralize the
administrative system and to restore the position of local government. In order to
achieve a more decentralized administrative system the government announced a
series of general measures:2
1) The abolishment or reduction of central rules that govern the execution of local
government functions. Detailed administrative regulations should be replaced
by general statutory control, if any.
2) The substitution of specific grants by systems of financing that do not in any way
intervene in policy-making by local government. The budgets reserved for
specific grants should as much as possible be transferred to the Municipal Fund,
so local government can freely dispose of the resources. If for some reason a
transfer to the Municipal Fund would not be possible, then specific grants
should be amalgamated to broad specific grants covering wide policy areas.
3) The abolishment of administrative tutelage of local government by provincial or
central government agencies.
In our research, we named this a general approach to the decentralization issue.
We had several reasons for this. Firstly, with the obvious exception of defense,
foreign affairs and macro-economic policies, decentralization was meant to cover all
policy areas. Secondly, decentralization implied a series of general measures to be
2 Decentralisatienota (1980) p. 22– 25.
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applied to different policy sectors in the same way. Thirdly, central government
assumed that the increase in the discretion of local government would result in the
realization of a series of overall goals: customization in service delivery by local
government, an integrated approach of complex policy issues by local government,
the revitalization of local democracy and a higher efficiency of public service delivery.
Clearly, decentralization was above all instrumental to a more efficient and effective
public administration. We summarize the approach described above in Fig. 1.
In the twenty-five years that have passed since government launched the first plans
for decentralization a large number of projects to rearrange relations between central
government, provinces and municipalities were executed, which included a large
variety of policy sectors. The reduction of specific grants and administrative
regulation was substantial. Of the 532 specific grants in 1980 to the local, provincial
and regional government 152 grants survived in 2003, partly through the transfer of
financial resources to the Municipal and Provincial Funds, partly through the amal-
gamation of grants. Central regulation of planning and decision making procedures
was harmonized and simplified. A series of provisions for administrative supervision
was abolished.
One would say that general conditions for decentralization were favorable. Due
to a substantial increase in the scale of local government, Dutch municipalities are
relatively large. In the beginning of the 20th century there were 1121 municipalities
comprising an overall population of just over 5 million people. A slow paced but
steady process of consolidation resulted in a reduction to 483 municipalities in 2004,
while the overall population had risen to nearly 16,3 million people. The average
population of municipalities is now 33.660. Only 12 municipalities have less than
5000 inhabitants.
On balance, municipalities are relatively potent institutions that administer large
communities. Nevertheless, our research and analyses show that removal of
obstacles for local autonomy does not suffice to attain the professed goals. We will
present the essential findings of our research in Section 5, after having explained the
research methodology in the following section.
Methodology
In order to obtain a satisfactory view of the functioning of local government in the newly
decentralized practice, we conducted research in two phases: (a) secondary analysis of
previous research; (b) intensive field research in five areas of decentralization.
Fig 1. A general approach to decentralization
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Analysis of Previous Research
In this phase we researched the existing literature on the question whether
decentralization leads to the realization of its professed goal or goals, and which
factors have an impeding or stimulating effect. In this the professed goals (or
intended effects) of decentralization are understood as administrative goals in terms
of a better functioning of the internal or external administration. Often in
decentralization projects one refers to one or more sector goals within the
designated policy field. But in order to be able to compare the effects in one policy
field with those in other policy fields, it is necessary to give a specification of the
intended administrative effect(s), expressing the quality of the administration
concerned, e.g., customization in public service delivery, accessibility of public
administration, integrated policy-making, efficiency in public service.
After thorough selection seven evaluation studies appeared useful for our
analysis. These studies cover a wide range of policy areas.3 The analysis of the
relationship between decentralization and the quality of administration yielded a
series of explanatory factors, which we categorized as follows:
& Characteristics of the form of decentralization. These characteristics express which
authority is transferred to a lower tier of government, in relation to actors in the
adjoining fields, central actors, and to societal actors. We expect to find a relation
between the nature and scope of this authority and (desired and undesired) effects.
& Characteristics of the task or policy, subject to decentralization. Decentralization
may concern a wide range of policy programs. They can vary between occasional,
large-scaled and complex projects to relatively simple routine matters. Policy
programs may have regulating, distributive and re-distributive goals. We expect to
find a relation between the characteristics of the policy concerned and the realization
of the intended administrative goals.
& Characteristics of the policy field. Policy fields may differ strongly. A policy field
can be characterized by homogenous or diverging views on the solution of a
problem, by presence of shared or disputed professional norms, by presence or
absence of external effects, et cetera. We expect that the effects of decentral-
ization will vary with the variation in these characteristics.
This categorization has served as a heuristic tool in the second phase of our
research.
Field Research
The purpose of the second research phase was to verify and expand the results of
the analysis of the first phase. In order to achieve this we needed to carry out
intensive field research into decentralized practises. In selecting the cases we used
three criteria: sufficient range of policy areas, sufficient variety in nature and size of
3 The evaluations pertained to the decentralization of welfare policies, cre´che facilities policy,
welfare policies for the elderly, the conservation policy of monuments and historic buildings, policies
for the physically handicapped, urban renewal, and public housing to municipalities and housing
associations.
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the policy instruments handed over or attributed, and sufficient variety in the
volume and type of remaining central rules. The following areas of decentralization
were selected:
& decentralization of housing policies (Ministry of Housing);
& decentralization of city-parking policies (Ministry of Traffic and Transport);
& decentralization in the field of income relief (Ministry of Social Affairs);
& decentralization of central funding of school transport (Ministry of Education);
& decentralization of the care for vulnerable groups: homeless, addicts and abused
women (Ministry of Public Health and Welfare).
The research in this phase consisted of case study research including direct
observation, documentation research, archive study, and open and closed interviews,
combined with questionnaires in three of the five researched policy areas. The spe-
cific nature of each policy area required a tailored methodical design for each field.
In the area of public housing we conducted research in six regional governments,
which were characterized by different distributive rule systems. In the area of mu-
nicipal parking policies we carried out case study research into the effects of
decentralizing measures in eight cities that are widely spread over the country and
of various size. The research into the effects of decentralization in the field of
income relief was carried out in two phases. The first phase comprised eight case
studies of local government practice of special income relief. Based on insights de-
rived from these case studies, questionnaires were issued to both policy-makers and
civil servants. In the fourth chosen area4-municipal funding of school transport-the
dominant method of research was a combination of case studies and questionnaires
among policy-makers, civil servants as well as citizens who used this service. The
fifth area concerned the decentralized system of care for vulnerable groups. This
task is assigned to 45 municipalities that act for all the municipalities in their region.
Our fieldwork was carried out in six of these municipalities. The most important
findings of these case studies were verified by means of a questionnaire issued
among all of the 45 municipalities.
Results
Decentralization and the Customization of Public Service Delivery
One major problem that was attributed to centralization was that it impeded local
governments to customize public service delivery, i.e., to adjust it to local
circumstances and to specific needs of the public. In many policy areas, the
discretion of local government was severely constrained by centrally specified
standards of service provision. In many cases, these standards formed part of the
rules and regulations of specific grants allocated by central government. We will give
just two of many possible examples.
4 This policy area we researched in co-operation with the SCO– Kohnstamm Institute of the
University of Amsterdam.
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Central government provided grants for the construction and improvement of
public housing and specified in detail the amounts that local governments could
allocate to a housing project depending on its characteristics. The detailed standards
frequently conflicted with plans for construction and improvement that addressed
local circumstances and demands from the housing associations, the house-owners or
tenants.
Local government is statutorily required to provide income relief for those
without means of support. Central government compensated local government for
the expenditure for income relief, but at the same time issued detailed regulations
with respect to the amounts to be paid to citizens according to their (standardized)
personal circumstances. The detailed standards frequently conflicted with the vast
variation in personal circumstances, sometimes leaving citizens in obvious need.
One central assumption of the general approach to decentralization was that the
abolishment or substantial reduction of central rules with respect to local service
provision would enhance the capacity of local government for customization. In
accordance with this general assumption in a number of policy areas specific grants
were amalgamated to form broad grants, while at the same time central rules for
spending were reduced. In other policy areas, specific grants were transferred to the
general Municipal Fund eliminating nearly all restraints for local government.
Research shows that the effects of the reduction of central rules on the
customization of service provision vary. Whether customization is realized depends
on certain characteristics of the policy area and on local circumstances. Central to
the understanding of the influence of these characteristics and conditions is that the
customization of service delivery presupposes that government institutions have all
the relevant information at their disposal and take this information into account
when making their decisions. Our research showed that the active involvement of
interest groups, social institutions or individual citizens in the decision making
process of local government is a crucial factor in the customization of public
services. In some policy areas this involvement has a long-standing tradition and is
fostered by the fact that the decisions of local government have an impact on a wide
range of interests.
In the fields of urban renewal, public housing and regulation of city parking (the
introduction of no-parking zones, parking licenses and wheel clamps), we found that
interest groups (i.e., associations of small businesses and tenants) and social institu-
tions (i.e., housing associations) are active players in the decision making processes
(RIGO, 1989; Fleurke et al., 1984, 1996). They take part in hearings, consultative
bodies or project groups to see that all information they deem relevant is presented,
and to defend their interests. If they lack institutional presence, they find ways to
influence the local executives or the local council. On the other end, local govern-
ment culture furthers the active involvement of social groups in decision making. No
self-respecting local executive would consider making decisions with a major impact
on local society without a broad consultation of the social groups and institutions
concerned. The combination of the reduction of central rules and the active in-
volvement of citizens in local decision-making results in the customization of public
service delivery. The reduction of central rules removes the obstacle to tailor deci-
sions to local circumstances and needs. The presence of strong social player’s forces
local government to actually take these circumstances and needs into account.
While we found that customization as one of the desired results of decentraliza-
tion was attained in the policy areas mentioned above, this was not the case in the
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field of income relief. Decentralization in this policy area implied the transfer of
former specific grants to the Municipal Fund. The general mandatory provision for
local government to provide income relief to citizens in need survived, but central
government abolished nearly all other regulations with respect to municipal policies.
This would enable local government to customize its decisions, at least that was the
assumption.
Our research showed that only 25% of the Dutch municipalities attained a
satisfactory level of customization (Fleurke et al., 1995). In 25% of the municipalities
decisions allocating additional income to citizens in need showed serious flaws,
while in the remaining 50% of the municipalities at least part of the practice of
income relief was defective. One of our main findings was that programmed
instruction of the decision-making process accounted for the difference between
good and bad practice. Individual officials of the local government agency involved
are the actual decision-makers with respect to the allotment of additional income to
citizens. Clients who apply for additional income generally lack bureaucratic
competence. They have little or no knowledge of their rights, do not know what
information is relevant to the decision they seek and cannot argue their case in front
of the government official. The burden of customization almost completely lies with
the government agency. We found that local government agencies that developed
few and global rules to guide decision-making by their officials performed badly
with respect to customization. The lack of rules leads officials to grade clients and
their personal circumstances into manageable categories to simplify decision-
making. In this process, they tend to neglect the individual needs of clients. Other
local agencies developed extensive decision-making programs forcing their officials
to scrutinize the personal circumstances and needs of their clients and to address the
needs accordingly. They performed well in terms of customization.
In a paradoxical way, in the case of income relief, after the abolishment of central
regulation the development of rules to guide decision-making within the local
agencies proved a condition to attain customization. Of course, the successful
internal regulation of decision-making contained rules of a specific character. They
did not forbid or prescribe the allotment of fixed amounts according to standardized
personal circumstances of clients, as the former central rules did. Instead, they
instructed officials to investigate the personal circumstances of each client actively.
They extensively specified circumstances that would justify the allotment of
additional income and invited or even obliged officials to deviate from existing
general norms in special circumstances. We found that agencies in smaller
municipalities in general lacked the capacity to develop extensive decision-making
programs, although some co-operated with other municipalities to achieve this. The
agencies in the larger municipalities had the necessary capacities, but not all found
decision-making programs relevant.
Does a reduction of central regulation result in the customization of public
service delivery? Our research suggests that it depends on characteristics of the
function local government has to perform and on conditions in the policy field.
Some functions of local government concern the development and execution of
plans and projects that regard the community as a whole or the interests of
organized social groups. In these cases, the political culture generally ensures the
active involvement of social groups and interest groups in decision-making by local
government. Consequently, decisions are tailored to local circumstances and to
the interests of local groups. Other functions of local government concern the de-
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livery of services to individual citizens. In many cases, this means that there is no
countervailing power for local government to enforce customization. Decentral-
ization does not lead to customization, unless additional measures support or incite
local government to develop adequate decision-making programs.
Decentralization and the Vitality of Local Democracy
The Constitution and the Municipal Government Act attribute the full authority of
local government to the elected councils. Although each municipality by law
disposes of an executive board, all decision-making powers lay with the elected
council, unless the law stipulates otherwise. The local council appoints the executive
board. With exception of the mayor, who is appointed by central government,
members of the executive board are recruited from and retain membership of the
elected council.5 Local government design was monistic, concentrating legislative
and executive powers with the elected council. In practice however, the system had
become increasingly dualistic. As the functions of local government grew more
complex, councils delegated decision-making authority to the executive boards. The
laws that-with the rise of the Welfare State-prescribed local governments to
participate in the delivery of public services, generally attributed decision-making
powers to the executive boards and not to the local councils. Dependency of local
government on specific grants gave rise to an extensive practice of negotiations
between local executive boards and central government agencies. Local councils
formally disposed of a series of competencies to establish plans and to issue
ordinances relevant to the execution of local policies. In practice their role
increasingly consisted in grudgingly approving proposals prepared by the executive
boards, who themselves had little room to operate because of central rules and
policies and their dependency on financial resources controlled by central
government agencies. The representative function of local councils was undermined,
the vitality of local democracy threatened. Central government assumed that the
reduction of central regulation and of the financial dependency of local government
would restore the position of the elected council and revitalize local democracy.
In our research on the effects of decentralization, we focused on the actual role of
the elected council. Did the enhancement of the discretion of local government lead
to a consolidation of the position of local council as the principal body of local
government? Did local councils actually discuss general policies in the policy area
concerned; did they instruct and control the executive boards? Again, effects of
decentralization proved not uniform. Two factors influence the actual role of local
government councils: the scope and social impact of the local government function
and the power-dependency relations between local government and social
institutions.
In some policy areas, decentralization implies that local government becomes
responsible for all or nearly all government functions. This is the case in public
housing, urban renewal and city-parking policies. In these areas, there are no
5 In 2002 an administrative reform on local and provincial level was instituted, whereby the monistic
system was replaced by a dualistic one. The effects of this reform are not yet clear.
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statutory obligations for local government to formulate or execute policies; the
initiative lies with local government itself. Policy-making in these areas comprises a
series of decisions and activities with substantial implications for local society, that
sometimes give rise to intense social debate. Large budgets are involved on which
local councils have to decide. These characteristics guarantee that local councils
discuss the major decisions involved, instruct the executive boards and in time
evaluate the policy-results (Fleurke et al., 1996, 1997).
In other policy areas, the scope of local government remains restricted to the
execution of statutorily prescribed functions, although decentralization has increased
the discretion of local government. This is the case in the areas of income relief and of
the funding of special provisions for the physically handicapped. In both cases, the law
stipulates a central criterion for the allotment of financial benefits. Although
discretion of local government to formulate its own policies within the limits of law
is considerable, most elected councils have not bothered to do so. They have left the
execution of these tasks to local government agencies under the supervision of the
executive board. Interestingly, a marked number of elected councils in the cities did
take initiatives to create special poverty funds. They were meant to facilitate the
participation of the poor in social and cultural activities and sports and to support
families in debt. Although the impact of these special funds was insignificant
compared to the statutorily prescribed individual income relief, elected councils
evaluated the spending of the funds every year and discussed the policies to follow.
They considered the poverty funds as their own, while they thought of the statutorily
prescribed income relief merely as a provision of central government, that
accidentally had to be offered by local government (Fleurke et al., 1995).
In many policy areas, non-governmental organizations play an important part in
the delivery of public services. Housing associations receive government funds to
build and improve public housing. A variety of welfare and cultural institutions
offers a wide range of services: from childcare to social welfare for the elderly, from
youth work to the provision of bed and breakfast for the homeless. Local
government allocates financial resources and formulates general policies; the non-
governmental organizations are the actual providers of public services. This division
of labor creates mutual interdependencies between the parties involved. Conse-
quently, the local executive boards generally confer and negotiate extensively with
non-governmental organizations before submitting plans and policies to the elected
councils. In some policy areas, decentralization increased the responsibility of local
government, but it did not strengthen the position of local government in relation to
non-governmental organizations. Under the centralized administrative system,
central government agencies initiated policies to address new social issues and
backed local executives in their relations with non-governmental organizations.
After decentralization, local government was on its own, and some times without
policy-instruments to counterbalance the power of non-governmental organizations.
Consequently, the executive boards developed plans and policies dominated by the
particular interests of non-governmental organizations, letting the elected councils
little or no room to articulate non-vested interests. The delivery of welfare services
provides a good example of this phenomenon. In the years after decentralization of
budgets for welfare services, there was a substantial and growing need for day care
centers for young children. Municipalities however did not reallocate financial
resources accordingly. Despite general cutbacks, the vested non-governmental
welfare organizations retained their budgets (Steinmann, 1991). Dependency of
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local government on non-governmental organizations restrains the role of elected
councils, in the same way as dependency of local government on central agencies
did before decentralization.
On balance, we conclude that decentralization does not suffice to strengthen the
position of the local councils. In the first place, this depends on the scope and
features of local government functions. If decentralization involves public services
that are important to the local community as a whole and local government is in full
control, elected councils are likely to take charge, and instruct and control the
executive boards. If on the other hand, decentralization merely reduces the
regulation concerning the execution of statutory dictated functions, the executive
boards-if not their civil servants-are likely to absorb the increase in discretion. In the
second place, elected councils will enhance their grip on policy-making when
decentralization strengthens the position of local government vis-a´-vis non-
governmental organizations and interest groups, by providing it with policy-
instruments.
Decentralization and Policy Integration by Local Government
In the analysis of central government, the organizational differentiation of central
government agencies is responsible for the fragmentation of policies concerning
public service delivery in local communities. When local government has to deal
with complex policy issues, fragmentation of central policies impedes an integral
approach. As with the rise of the Welfare State the complexity of social problems
increased, central government deemed integrated handling of these problems more
and more necessary. At the same time, it recognized that it was not able to realize
integration. Elaborated planning systems failed to produce the necessary coordina-
tion; efforts to reorganize central government met with strong resistance of the
ministries and agencies.
Decentralization was thought to solve this problem. The transfer of decision-
making powers to local government would overcome the problems of fragmenta-
tion. It was hoped that local councils and local executive boards would be able to
formulate and execute integrated policies. Research proved this a rather naive
theory. Decentralization by itself does not result in policy integration by local
government. There are two more obstacles to overcome.
In the first place, organizational differentiation is not limited to central govern-
ment. It pervades the entire public bureaucracy. During the last twenty-five years,
many municipalities have made substantial efforts to reduce organizational differen-
tiation. However, no organizational model can cover all interdependencies between
social processes and policies. Moreover, over time new interdependencies manifest
themselves and it takes time to adjust organizational differentiation and coordination.
Organizational differentiation of local government was manifest in several policy
areas. For example, central government encouraged local government to develop
integrated welfare policies for the elderly. Many municipalities put their social
welfare agencies in charge of integrating policies on housing, health care, income
relief and community work. They did not find it any easier to obtain cooperation from
local public administration than it had been from central government agencies under
the centralized administrative system. Although one of the members of the local
executive board usually was entrusted with the responsibility to coordinate policies
for the elderly, this did not prove a sufficient condition to realize integration
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(Kwekkeboom, 1994). We noted similar experiences in the field of urban renewal,
the policies for socially deprived groups, and the care for vulnerable groups
(Fleurke, 1982; Van der Pennen and Ter Borg, 1996; Fleurke et al., 2002). Research
showed that when the issue is high on the local political agenda this constitutes a
favorable condition for integration: it provides the coordinating agency with
grounds to claim cooperation from other agencies. Even then, integration is a
difficult task for local government.
In the second place, as we mentioned before, non-governmental organizations
play an important part in the actual delivery of public services. The rationale for the
involvement of non-governmental organizations generally lies in their expertise of
the issues at hand and in the fact that they maintain long-established relationships
with client groups. By their very nature, they are specialized institutions with vested
interests. Consequently, when addressing complex policy issues, local government
faces organizational differentiation of the agencies involved. Some of the non-
governmental organizations receive their financial resources directly from central
government. In the last twenty– five years, the autonomy of non-governmental
organizations vis-a´-vis government agencies has been enhanced. Central govern-
ment not only embarked upon policies of decentralization, but on policies of
deregulation as well. This complicates local governments’ task to develop and
execute integrated policies. Although the position of local government in relation to
central government has become stronger, the same applies to the position of non-
governmental organizations in relation to local government. In several policy areas,
after decentralization local government failed to develop and execute integrated
policies (Kwekkeboom, 1994; Van der Pennen and Ter Borg, 1996; Fleurke et al.,
2002). At least part of this was because local government lacked instruments to
effectively coordinate the activities of the non-governmental organizations involved.
Policy integration proves an even more difficult task in times of contraction. In
the eighties and early nineties decentralization projects were a means for central
government to realize cutbacks in government spending. Central government used
the transfer of specific grants to the Municipal Fund and the amalgamation of
specific grants to reduce the financial resources allocated to local government.
Decentralization was supposed to enable local government to operate in a more
efficient way, so central government collected in advance. Policy integration implies
the rearrangement of resources. Activities and policies directed at specific goals
must be redirected to contribute to goals that are part of an integrated policy. As we
mentioned before, local agencies in charge of integrating the policies of other
agencies, governmental and non-governmental, rarely dispose of instruments for
effective coordination. They have to realize integration through intensive processes
of persuasion and bargaining. When resources are relatively abundant, agencies
have room to give in for the sake of good relations. In times of contraction agencies
tend to retreat to their own domain and guard their particular interests. Research
showed that efforts to develop integrated policies concerning residential housing for
the elderly and local welfare provisions failed because the agencies involved were
too busy trying to make ends meet. They focussed on the realization of their own
particular goals (Van den Ham et al., 1989; Steinmann, 1991).
There is no doubt that under centralized administration the fragmentation of
central government policies was a hindrance for local government to pursue policy
integration. Decentralization did concentrate decision-making powers with local
government reducing the organizational differentiation of the administrative system
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as a whole. This did not however remove all the obstacles for integrated
policymaking. The organizational differentiation of local government itself, and of
the non-governmental agencies in the policy field, are still barriers to overcome.
Nevertheless, it is possible for central government to create favorable conditions for
policy integration at the local level. Knowledge transfers about successful projects in
other local communities can support local government agencies in their efforts to
develop integrated policies. Additional financial resources can buy cooperation from
other government organizations and non-government agencies. The availability of
policy-instruments for local government to effectively coordinate the activities of
non-governmental organizations is crucial. If central government finds integrated
policy making a general interest, it cannot limit decentralization to the abolition of
central rules and administrative supervision.
Decentralization and Efficiency
Central government decentralization plans assumed a direct and univocal relation
between decentralization on one hand and customization, the revitalization of local
democracy and the enhancement of the problem solving capacity of local
government on the other. Assumptions about the relation between decentralization
and efficiency were more complicated. In accordance with insights from theories on
fiscal relations the decentralization plans mentioned both advantages and risks with
respect to the efficiency of local public service delivery (cf. King, 1984).
One of the risks mentioned was that so called technical inefficiencies would occur
in the case of decentralization of government functions that require substantial
expertise or that benefit from large-scale production. As we mentioned before, the
scale of Dutch local government has increased over the years. There is a general
belief that municipalities are competent to provide a wide range of public services, if
not on their own then in cooperation with their neighbors. This belief is fostered by
research that shows that citizens are generally content with the quality of service-
delivery by local government. Furthermore, research carried out to evaluate
consolidation policies failed to prove substantial differences in the quality of service
delivery between municipalities of different size (Derksen et al., 1989; Denters et al.,
1990). Technical inefficiencies were not a real issue in the debate on decentraliza-
tion. Nor was the hazard of technical inefficiencies ever a motive to decentralize
government functions to municipalities according to their size.6
Evaluations of service delivery by local government after decentralization show
that the issue of technical efficiency deserves more attention. In several policy-areas
small municipalities performed markedly worse than large ones. In the field of
public housing, during the first years after decentralization the average price of new
houses in small municipalities was 5 to 10% higher than in large ones. This was
because the smaller municipalities lacked the knowledge and expertise to appraise
the plans submitted by housing associations, a function formerly executed by a
central government agency (RIGO, 1984). The large municipalities simply took on
6 As is the case in Spain, where the Local Government Act (1989) distinguishes four categories of
municipalities according to size, and specifies different functions for each category (Carrillo, 1997: 45).
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specialists to do so, some times engaging the former staff of the central government
agency. When the administrative regulation for the funding of special provisions for
the physically handicapped was abolished, the larger municipalities set out to
organize collective transport facilities. The facilities were adequate and relatively
cheap. Most of the smaller municipalities did not have sufficient scale for collective
facilities and continued their pre-decentralization practice to subsidize transport on
an individual basis (Vollering and Den Heeten, 1996). As we mentioned before, in
the area of income relief the smaller municipalities did not develop decision-making
programs that were necessary for customization, because of their small staffs.
In conclusion, central government underestimated the possible negative con-
sequences of decentralization with respect to the technical efficiency of public
service delivery. This is not to say that decentralization should not take place in
policy areas where extensive expertise and large-scale production are required.
There are functional equivalents to attain efficiency, i.e., cooperation between
local municipalities, outsourcing and the establishment of knowledge centers by
central government, to be used by local government on a voluntary basis. How-
ever, the issue of technical efficiency should be incorporated in the framework to
decide on decentralization. Moreover, it may be necessary to take special mea-
sures as a part of decentralization projects to prevent that technical inefficiencies
occur.
Theory on fiscal relations stipulates that decentralization of government functions
should not take place when there are substantial externalities, that is to say when
the advantages and costs of public service provision exceed the local community. If
this is the case, allocation of resources by local government will lead to either
underprovision or excessive spending. However, if externalities do not occur,
decentralized administrative systems, for a number of reasons, allocate resources
more efficiently than centralized systems do (King, 1984: 20– 24). First, specific
grants generally do not contain incentives for local government to seek efficiency, as
the benefits of such behavior will eventually fall to central government. According
to the decentralization plans, a transfer of specific grants to the Municipal Fund
should induce local government to optimize allocation, as it would gain complete
control of the financial resources. Second, specific grants generally come with
extensive administrative regulation to prevent local government from wasting funds.
Unfortunately, in many cases, these rules do not only prevent waste, they also
preclude alternative policies or measures of local government that produce more
social welfare. The reduction of administrative regulations, the creation of lump sum
budgets or broad specific grants would eliminate the obstacle for local government
and should enable it to realize efficient allocation.
Our research shows that not every form of decentralization is adequate to attain
the professed goals. The general approach to decentralization implied that the
Ministry of the Interior advocated the transfer of specific grants to the Municipal
Fund. In several policy areas, plans were developed accordingly. Specific grants that
existed for school transport, individual income relief and provisions for the
physically handicapped were transferred to the Municipal Fund. At the same time,
the national legislator established or confirmed statutory provisions that instructed
local government to deliver these services to their citizens. The combination of
complete financial responsibility and the statutory obligation to provide services had
negative consequences for the efficiency of allocation. In the areas concerned, local
government cannot control the volume of claims and expenditure. This depends on
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local social economic development, on choices of individual citizens and on policies
of other government agencies.7 Consequently, the discretion of local government to
freely allocate the financial resources it receives through the Municipal Fund is
severely restrained. If local governments honor the statutory rights of citizens, they
may be forced to cut back expenditure on other public services. Our research shows
that especially the smaller municipalities tried to protect themselves against this.
Some restricted facilities for the physically handicapped and for school transport to
an absolute minimum; others kept silent about the extension of citizens’ rights to
income relief in order to minimize applications (Vollering and Den Heeten, 1996;
Vermeulen et al., 1994; Fleurke et al., 1995). Clearly in these cases, the form of
decentralization chosen was not adequate to meet the subsequent goals.
Decentralization projects in the area of urban renewal and public housing show
that it is possible to design administrative systems that simultaneously enhance the
efficiency of allocation and guarantee basic provisions by local government (RIGO,
1989; Hulst, 2000). In both cases central government has created broad specific
grants to cover the entire policy area. The Urban Renewal Fund has been dis-
tributed among municipalities according to an estimate of the magnitude of the
problem. Local government was able to spend the resources as it pleased as long as
measures addressed the issue at hand. It could also decide to save the financial
resources for a maximum of five years, so pressures to spend did not distort allo-
cation decisions. The system contained incentives for local government for efficient
allocation. It expressed the eventual responsibility of central government for the
livability of towns and cities, without restraining local government in their policies.
However, the establishment of broad specific grants was considered a next best
solution, as the general decentralization approach advocated the abolishment of
specific grants.
Conclusions
In 1980 the Ministry of the Interior of the Netherlands developed a general ap-
proach to decentralization. It was convinced that the implementation of a series of
general decentralization measures would solve some of the serious problems central
government had in fulfilling welfare state functions. The Ministry’s assumption was
that a reduction of specific grants, central rules, procedures and administrative
supervision would overcome the fragmentation of central policies and enhance the
capacity of local government to respond to the needs of the population. In the view
of the Ministry, these reductions would all contribute to the realization of the
professed goals of decentralization: a more efficient and client-oriented delivery of
public services, better integrated policies vis-a´-vis complex policy issues, and the
revitalization of local democracy.
Our research shows that the decentralization in the Netherlands did not meet the
high expectations. In par. 4 we have seen that in certain situations the intended
effects were realized only partially or not at all. Our explanation for these results is
7 If schools decide to send pupils with learning problems to special schools, local government has to
meet the claims for school transport. A rise of unemployment, policies of health care institutions
and insurance companies bear directly on local expenditure for individual income relief.
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that the theoretical framework underlying the decentralization policies was robust
indeed, but unfortunately too simple. The main theoretical assumption had been
that a series of general measures would result in an overall more effective, efficient
and democratic administrative system, irrespective of the policy area. This approach
is shown to be in need of amendment on two central points. Firstly, the intended
effects of certain decentralization measures depend on the presence or absence of
conditions regarding characteristics of the government function, the policy area and
the local community. For example, whether the reduction of central regulation will
result in more effective service delivery depends on conditions like the complexity
of the tasks to be carried out by local government, on power-dependency relations
in the local policy networks, and on the scarcity of resources. Secondly, effects
depend on the specific decentralization measures. They depend on the scope of the
government function that is transferred, the localization of decentralization, the
volume and type of remaining central rules, and on the policy instruments local
government disposes of. General grants will, under certain conditions, not result in
the customization of service delivery or in efficient allocation. The increase in
discretion of local government does not result in integrated policy-making if local
government does not dispose of policy instruments to co-ordinate the activities of
non-governmental organizations. In other words, we concluded that a general
approach to decentralization must be replaced by a more specific theoretical
Fig 2. A contingency approach to decentralization
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framework that represents the contingent character of the effects of decentraliza-
tion. We have specified this in Fig. 2.
According to this model considerations regarding decentralization ideally consist
of at least three elements. The first element concerns the professed goal (or in-
tended effect) in terms of a better functioning of the internal or external ad-
ministration. It contains specifications of the intended administrative effects,
expressing the quality of the administration concerned. The second element of the
model regards the means, that is, an administrative system with a decentralized
character. Decentralized systems may take on various specific forms, depending the
scope of the decentralized government function, the localisation of decentralization
(municipality, regional government or province), the volume and type of remaining
central rules, and the policy instruments attributed to local government. The third
element specifies the goal-means relation by describing under which conditions this
relation exists. In our research we found a series of conditions relating to character-
istics of the decentralized policy and to characteristics of the policy field and of the
community in which the decentralized task is performed. These conditions influence
the degree of success in realizing the intended effects of decentralization. In a general
sense the model is based on the question, which form of decentralization causes which
effects on administrative quality under which conditions. In this way the model invites
to critical evaluation of existing decentralization policies and stimulates the careful
design of new decentralization policies.
In retrospect, the general approach to decentralization was beneficial, maybe
even necessary, to start up the process of reform. Resistance to decentralization was
tough. Ministries, nationally organized interest groups and parliament: they all stood
to loose influence on decision making in the national political arena. Several times,
after the first plans were launched, it proved necessary to create new impulses to
keep the process of decentralization going. A more subtle approach, emphasizing
possible disadvantages and limitations of decentralization, might have fed the forces
of resistance. After twenty-five years however, there is no longer a need to argue the
case for decentralization. The centralist bias that was typical for the era of the rise of
the Welfare State has been overcome. Consequently, it is time to incorporate the
experiences of the last twenty-five years in the theoretical framework that underlies
decentralization policies. Evidently the assumptions of the general decentralization
approach do not hold and the continuous use of this framework is bound to have
negative effects. When decentralization is based on high-strung expectations and
results are disappointing, re-centralization is imminent. There are several examples
of lobby’s and claims for re-centralization after disappointing results of decentral-
ization projects, and in some cases central government responded favorably to these
claims.8 This might have been prevented if there had been more realistic expect-
ations about the effects of decentralization. Moreover, a careful design of
decentralized administrative systems, taking into account the experiences of the
8 Organisations of physically handicapped urged central government to issue rules for local
government to guarantee minimum standards of service provision and to restrict client con-
tributions. Central government responded to the latter claim. Associations of parents demanded
central rules with respect to quality of school transport. Trade unions and members of parliament
asked the Ministry of Social Affairs to intervene in local policies, when research showed that local
governments spent substantially less on income relief than they did before decentralization.
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last twenty five years, will result in more effective policy making and service
delivery.
References
Agranoff R (1996) Federal evolution in spain. Int Polit Sci Rev 17(4):385– 401
Bennett RJ (ed) (1993) Local government in the new europe. London: Belhaven Press
Breuss F, Markus E (2004) The optimal decentralisation of government activity: normative recom-
mendations for the European constitution. Const Polit Econ 15:27– 76
Carrillo E (1997) Local Government and Strategies for Decentralization in the FState of the
Autonomies._ Publius 27(4):39– 63
Chandler JA (ed) (1993) Local Government in Liberal Democracies. London: Routledge
Crook RC (2003) Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of local-central
relations. Public Adm Dev 23:77– 88
Denters SAH, de Jong HM en Thomassen JJA (1990) Kwaliteit van gemeenten. Een onderzoek
naar de relatie tussen de omvang van gemeenten en de kwaliteit van het lokaal bestuur. Den
Haag: VUGA
Derksen W, Korsten AFA en de Beer Th HM (1989) Lokaal bestuur in Nederland. Inleiding in de
gemeentekunde. Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom Tjeenk Willink
Devas N, Grant U (2003) Local government decision-making-citizen participation and local account-
ability: some evidence from Kenya and Uganda. Public Adm Dev 23: 307– 316
Fernande´z SF (1994) El reparto de competencias entre el Estado y las Comunidades Autu˚ˆnomas: su
problematica general. Regap 7:39– 68
Fleurke F (1982) Toegankelijkheid van het openbaar bestuur. Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom Tjeenk
Willink
Fleurke F, van Harten H, Hulst JR, Paardekooper J en de Vries PJ (1984) Planning en
decentralisatie van de volkshuisvesting. Den Haag: Ministerie van VROM
Fleurke F, Hulst JR en de Vries PJ (1995) Maatwerk en rechtsgelijkheid in de bijzondere
bijstandsverlening. Een studie naar de effecten van decentralisatie. Den Haag: VUGA
Fleurke F, M Prins, Hulst JR (1996) Fiscalisering van het betaald parkeren. Een onderzoek naar de
effecten van een gemengd centraal/decentraal regime van handhaving van gemeentelijk
parkeerbeleid. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit
Fleurke F, Hulst JR, de Vries PJ (1997) Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek. Den Haag: Sdu
Uitgevers
Fleurke F, Jochemsen MC, van Montfort AJGM, de Vries PJ (2002) Selectieve decentralisatie en de
zorg voor kwetsbare groepen. Den Haag: VNG Uitgeverij
Fleurke F, Willemse R (2004) Approaches to decentralization and local autonomy. A critcal
appraisal. Adm Theory Prax 26(4):523– 544
Ham C, Jansen J van den, Klijn EH (1989) Planning onder druk. Een onderzoek naar de inhoud en
totstandkoming van de provinciale en grootstedelijke plannen voor bejaardenoorden. RIW, Delft
Hulst JR (2000) De bestuurlijke vormgeving van regionale beleidsvoering. Een vergelijkende studie
op het terrein van de volkshuisvesting. Delft: Eburond
Joumard I, Per Mathis K (2003) Fiscal relations across government levels. OECD Econ Stud 36(1)
King DN (1984) Fiscal tiers. The economics of multi-level government. Allen & Unwin, London
Koopmans L, Wellink AHEM, de Kam CA en Woltjer HJ (1999) Overheidsfinancie¨n. Houten:
Educatieve Partners Nederland
Kwekkeboom MH (1994) Rapportage Welzijnswerk, Deel 4, De rol van de gemeente in het
ouderenbeleid. Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP)
Maurel M- C (1993) Small communes and rural areas. Decentralization reforms in France. In R.J.
Bennett (ed) Local Government in the New Europe. London: Belhaven Press
Montricher N de (1995) Decentralization in France. Governance: An international Journal of Policy
and Administration 8(3):405– 418
Namenwirth JZ, Weber R Ph (1987) Dynamics of Culture. Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin
Page EC, Goldsmith M (eds) (1987) Central and Local Government Relations. A comparitive
analysis of West European Unitary States. London: Sage
Pennen AW van der en ter Borg E (1996) Rapportage Welzijnswerk, Deel 5, Welzijn en sociale
vernieuwing. Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP)
Public Organiz Rev (2006) 6: 37–56 55
Springer
RIGO (Research Instituut Gebouwde Omgeving) (1984) Budgetstelsel en decentralisatie van de
Volkshuisvesting. Den Haag: Ministerie van VROM
RIGO (Research Instituut Gebouwde Omgeving) en Werkgroep 2000. (1989) De stads-en
dorpsvernieuwing gedecentraliseerd. Amsterdam
Steinmann PLM (1991) Rapportage Welzijnswerk, Deel 2, Onderzoek naar condities voor
gemeentelijk beleid in de jaren tachtig. Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP)
Toonen Th AJ (1987) A decentralised unitary state in a welfare society. West Eur Polit 10(2):108–
129
Vermeulen M, Lington H en, Peetsma TTD (1994) Gemeentelijk beleid voor het Leerlingenver-
voer. Academisch Boeken Centrum, De Lier
Vollering DC, en den Heeten J (1996) Beoordeling van een decentralisatieoperatie. De Wet
voorzieningen Gehandicapten. Bestuurswetenschappen 3:195– 215
Vries MS de (2000) The rise and fall of decentralization: a comparative analysis of arguments and
practices in European countries. Eur J Polit Res 38:193–224
Frederik Fleurke has a chair in Public Administration at the Department of Public Administration
and Organisation Science of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. He lectures on intergovernmental
relations and administrative analysis, and has published extensively on centralization and decen-
tralization. His current research is into the influence of the European Union on the national
administrations of EU-members.
Rudie Hulst teaches public administration at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam. His research covers issues of centralization and decentralization, co-operation and co-
ordination in intergovernmental policy networks and the impact of Europeanization on intergov-
ernmental relations in the member states of the EU.
56 Public Organiz Rev (2006) 6: 37–56
Springer
